重庆市人民政府


重庆市果树种子苗木管理办法

（重府发〔１９９５〕１００号　一九九五年五月二十九日）



第一条 为了加强果树种子苗木管理，防止病虫害的传播蔓延，保证种子苗木的质量，促进果品生产的健康发展，根据《中华人民共和国种子管理条例》、《植物检疫条例》和《四川省农作物种子管理条例》结合本市实际，制定本办法。
第二条 本办法所称果树种子苗木（以下简称果树种苗）是指柑桔、苹、梨、桃、李、杏、葡萄等果树的苗木、砧木、砧木种子、接穗、插条及其它繁殖材料。
第三条 凡在本市行政区域内从事果树种苗生产、繁殖、经营以及调运的单位和个人，必须遵守本办法。
第四条 市、区（市）县农业主管部门统一管理本行政区域内果树种苗工作农业主管部门设置的果树管理机构负责日常具体管理工作（原分工由林业主管部门管理的干果类果树种苗，仍由林业主管部门负责）。
第五条 各级农业主管部门应建立健全果树种苗繁育推广体系，逐步实现果树种苗良种化、良种区域化、质量标准化，淘汰低劣品种，有计划地建立良种母本园和良种苗圃，提供优质种苗。
政府鼓励开发果树种苗科学研究，推广先进技术，提高果品生产的科学技术水平。
第六条 果树管理机构应向生产、经营单位和个人公布、宣传本市果品发展和品种布局规划；不定期提供果树种苗需求信息及规格质量标准；推荐和推广优良品种，提供果树种苗栽培技术服务。
第七条 生产、经营商品果树种苗实行许可证制度。
生产商品果树种苗的单位和个人，应具备相应的技术力量和生产条件，经所在地县级以上农业主管部门审批，核发《种子生产许可证》。
经营果树种苗的单位和个人，应具备相应的经营条件，经所在地县级以上农业主管部门审批，核发《种子经营许可证》，凭证向工商行政管理机关申领营业执照后方可经营。
果树种苗的生产者、经营者，应对生产、经营的果树种苗质量负责。严禁不合格果树种苗流入市场。
第八条 商品果树种苗出圃前，必须经所在地县级以上农业主管部门设置的果树管理机构按质量标准进行规格、质量检查。并按规定履行检疫手续，取得《种子摄影师合格证》和《植物检疫证书》方能出围。
第九条 选育、收进果树种苗在本市推广，必须是经四川省农作物品种，未经审定或审定未通过的品种，不得经营，推广和进行商业性宣传。
鼓励生产、经营单位和个人选育、收进优良品种。
第十条 凡从市外调进果树种苗的单位和个人应当事先征得县级以上植物检疫机构的同意，并按照《植物检疫条例》的规定履行检疫手续。严禁从疫区调进果树种苗。
第十一条 凡无《种子质量合格证》、《植物检疫证书》的果树、种苗，铁路、公路、水运、邮政、民航等部门不得承运。
第十二条 果树种苗执法监督管理人员，必须廉洁奉公，秉公执法，办事公道，不得以权谋私，收受贿赂，不得参与果树种苗营利性经营活动。执行公务时应出示执法证件和佩带《中国种子管理》胸章。
第十三条 果树管理机构及其管理人员有以下行为之一的，由所在单位或者上级主管部门对直接责任人员给予行政处分，所核发的证件无效。
（一）对不具备生产商品果树种苗条件的单位和个人核发《种子生产许可证》的；
（二）对不符合国家标准的果树种苗签发《种子质量合格证》的；
（三）不依照国家规定的经营条件核发《种子经营许可证》的。
第十四条 违反本办法第七条的规定，未取得《种子生产许可证》或《种子经营许可证》生产、经营商品果树种苗的，由果树管理机构责令停止生产、经营、没收违法所得，可并处5000元以下罚款。
未取得营业执照从事果树种苗经营的，由工商行政管理机关依法处理。
第十五条 违反本办法第九条规定，经营或者推广示经审定或审定未通过的品种的，由果树管理机构责令停止经营和推广，根据情节轻重给予警告，没收种苗和违法所得，造成经济损失的，责令赔偿损失。
第十六条 违反本办法第十条的规定，从疫区调进果树种苗的，由植物检疫机构予以没收或销毁，可并处10000元以下罚款（销毁费用由责任人承担）。
第十七条 经营商品果树种苗未附有《种子质量合格证》或者以次充好，参杂使假的，果树管理机构有权责令停止经营活动，扣押其果树种苗；由工商行政管理机关依法处理。给使用者造成经济损失的，责令赔偿损失。
第十八条 当事人对行政处罚不服的，可以在接到处罚通知之日起15日内，向作出处罚决定的机关的上一级机关申请复议；对复议决定不服的，可以在接到复议决定起15日内向人民法院起诉；期满不起诉又不履行的，由作出处罚决定的机关申请人民法院执行。
第十九条 本办法规定的罚没款由处罚单位负责收缴上交同级财政，并使用财政部门统一印制的罚没款专用收据。
第二十条 本办法实施中的具体问题，由重庆市农牧渔业局负责解释。
第二十一条 本办法自1995年6月15日起施行。《重庆市果树种苗管理暂行规定》（重府发「1986」101号）《重庆市果树种苗管理暂行规定实施办法》（重府函「1987」100号）同时废止。




1995年5月29日
我国国企MBO制度缺陷与对策研究

江泽利



摘 要

MBO是英文Management Buy-out的缩写，中文通常被译作“管理层”收购，是指公司的管理层利用借贷所融资本或股权交易收购本公司股权，以改变公司的所有者结构、资产结构和控制权结构，使企业原经营者成为企业所有者的一种行为。
我国自引进MBO制度以来，对国有企业，尤其是对我国中小型国有企业，通过管理层收购实施了国有股产权改革，取得了较好的成效。但同时也暴露了许多产权改革过程中的不良现象，如，违规融资、不公开定价、“自卖自买”等交易，造成国有资产严重流失，引起了社会公众的普遍关注，也招致社会各界的议论和不满。
这些不满和议论随着“郎顾之争”的升温而被推向了高潮，成为继1994年“国企改革大讨论”之后的又一次“产权改革大讨论”，且迅速席卷全国。
讨论的中心议题是MBO是否还应该在中国继续被实施。 MBO过程中是否真的存在“国有资产流失”现象，政府是否应该停止国有企业MBO，诸如此类的问题也引起了政府的关注与重视。对此，国资委主任李荣融在2004年10月底的一次新闻发布会上发言时承认，“当前国有资产流失问题集中在MBO，而MBO收购过程中的主要问题就是自卖自买”。2004年12月12日，时任国务院副总理的黄菊同志，又在出席2004年度中央企业负责人年终总结大会时指出：“大型企业不准搞管理层收购，中小企业的管理层收购也要区别情况，要规范。对于管理层收购，国资委要制定发布专门文件，做到有章可循。”
政府代表的发言表明，一，对我国国有企业MBO的功过是非予以了客观评价。为回应民众要求制止民脂民膏不被侵吞的强烈呼声，对发生在国有企业MBO过程的非正常现象予以承认。二，国有企业中还将继续实施MBO。我国国有资产改革的大方向不会变，MBO作为国有企业实现国有股减持的有效措施仍将被继续。三，我国国有企业MBO过程中存在着的这样或那样的一些不尽人意问题，是可以通过制度完善，规范操作来加以避免的。
政府对规范MBO行为有信心，我也一样希望对MBO制度缺陷与对策进行研究分析的，探索一套可行的制度，以保证MBO健康进行。本文通过引用西方经济学理论，如激励机制、产权理论、新制度经济学、产业经济学、产业结构理论、博弈论、制度供给理论及信息经济学等，对我国国有企业MBO制度及制度实施现状进行了全面分析研究，并适度采用了对比法，对中外MBO制度理论进行对比分析。全文共分为三个部分：
第一部分为第1章，是论文基础部分。在这一部分，作者通过对MBO的起源及基本概念的界定，提出了自己的初步观点，即，MBO是“管理者收购”，而非“管理层收购”，充实了长期以来指导我国MBO实践的理论。
第二部分包括第2、3两章，是论文实证分析部分，也是理论联系实际的重要部分。在这一部分，作者从我国国有企业MBO的历史出发，客观评述了MBO对我国国有企业产权改革的重要作用，也揭示了MBO实践中存在的一些问题；接着，作者又从我国现行有关MBO制度入手，阐明了我国现行MBO制度的现状及存在的缺陷和不足，为对策研究提供了充分的事实依据。
第三部分为第4章，是对策和建议部分。这一部分在前面两部分基础之上，从理论创新、制度完善、监督控制等几个方面，对避免和防止MBO实施过程中“国有资产流失”现象，提出了一整套建设性建议和应对措施。对我国国有企业MBO目标及实施措施提出了新的要求，也是对前两部分研究的综合与提升，是本文研究的落脚点，充分体现了本文研究的理论和实践意义。

关键词: 国有企业 MBO 制度缺陷 对策


Abstract

MBO is an abbreviation of Management Buy-out in English. In Chinese, the abbreviation is usually translated to purchase of "the management "that is refers to the management as one level of the company, for change the owner structure, the property structure and the domination structure of the company, use to lend money to purchases the stock of this company, causes the enterprise original operator to become the enterprise owner's one kind of behavior.
Since our country has been introduced, the MBO system, as an implement of the property reform, to the state-owned enterprise, especially to our middle and small scale state-owned enterprise, which has achieved a good result.
But simultaneously, it also has exposed some undesirable phenomena in process of the property reforms, such as illegal financing, pricing is not open, "traders from buying", and other transactions, resulting in serious loss of state assets, has not only aroused the universal concern of the public but also lead to the community to debate and discontent.
Whit “the dispute of Lang with Gu” was heat up, these dissatisfaction and the discussion is pushed to the high tide, became "the property right to reform the big discussion" which is continues "the state-owned enterprise to reform the big discussion" in 1994, and rapidly sweep all over our country.
In this discussion, it is central that MBO whether also should continue in China. In the MBO process whether the real existence the phenomenon about "the state asset does drain", whether the government should stop state-owned enterprise MBO, the so forth question was repeatedly asked by the public that has aroused government department's interest and takes.
At end of October of 2004, arm at the Public matter of concern proposed which on the discussion process in, Li RongRong as director of State Asset Management Committee, make the speech at a press conference, said, "the question, the current state asset drains, to concentrate in MBO, but the main question, in the MBO process, is from sells buys".
On December 12th, 2004, Huang Ju ,as Vice-Premier of our State, in attends annual's end congress of 2004 year, pointed out, "The major industry does not permit to do MBO, in mid- and small-scale enterprise, the MBO also must distinguish the situation, wants the standard. Regarding the MBO, the State Asset Management Committee must formulate the issue special document, achieves has a legal basis."
In my opinion, the government representative's speech has indicated three meanings. Firstly, it is an evaluation to the operation of our state-owned enterprise by MBO. In order to respond the populace request to stop the action of embezzles which likes flesh and blood of the people, the government acknowledged that it is an unusual phenomenon that above mention phenomena in the MBO of state-owned enterprise process. Secondly, it is an attitude of our government on the question whether continues in the state-owned enterprise to implement MBO. The general orientation of our state asset reform have never been change, MBO, as one effective action to took the state-owned share reduction, will to be continue. Thirdly, these phenomena in our country state-owned enterprise MBO process is may be perfect through set up the standard operates performs and repaid the system to avoid.
Government acts to regulate MBO confidence, as I also hope that the MBO system defects and countermeasures research and analysis, to explore a workable system to ensure that the MBO health. By reference western economic theory, such as the incentive mechanism, and property rights theory, New　institution　Economics(NIE), industrial economics, and the industrial structure theory, game theory and information theory, and so on, I conducted a comprehensive analysis for China's state-owned enterprises MBO system and the status of implementation of the system, and appropriate use of the comparative method with the foreign MBO system theory. This thesis is divided into three parts:
Part I is chapter 1 is the basis of the thesis. In this section, the author through the MBO and the origin of the definition of basis concepts, raised individual preliminary view that, MBO is one kind of behavior about purchase by manager who is personal rather than by manager who are one collectivity, and enrich the guidance of China's MBO has a theory of practice.
Part II includes chapters 2 and 3, this section is an important part in the paper with empirical Analysis of linking theory with reality. In this section, the author objective review of the MBO as property rights reform of China abut state-owned enterprises from the history of MBO in china, and revealed the existence of the practice of some problems. Author has start study from China's current system of MBO, elaborated China's current MBO system and the status of the existing defects and shortcomings. This part is measures to provide sufficient factual basis for countermeasures study.
Part III be refers to Chapter 4 which is recommendations and responses for above write. Basis of the front part of this thesis, the author put forward a set of constructive proposals and responding to the program, for avoid and prevent the "loss of state assets" phenomenon, a set of constructive proposals and response measures, from the theoretical innovation, and the system improve, supervision and control etc several aspects.
These suggests put forward new requirements for target of reform in China's state-owned enterprises and standard of implementation. This is the end-result of this study and is consolidated and upgrading for parts I and II on this thesis which fully embodies the theoretical and practical significance.

Keyword: State-Owned Enterprises of China/ MBO/ System Shortcoming /Countermeasure

目 　录

论文摘要

第1章 绪 论 1
1．1 选题背景 1
1．1．1 问题的提出 1
1．1．2 研究的现实意义 2
1．2 MBO起源与概念界定 3
1．2．1 MBO的起源 3
1．2．2 MBO的概念 5